

Political Analytical Report of the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of Komala

The Current Political Situation and Our Tasks

Introduction

This report provides a brief examination of the current political situation in Iran and the consequences of the recent war involving the United States, Israel, and the Islamic Republic. Its purpose is to present a clear analysis for formulating the Party's future tactics and policies. Since the Party's publications and propaganda organs consistently strive to leave no analytical gaps on such issues, this report focuses on the key dimensions of the recent forty-day war and its impact on the region and the world. Although this war has not yet resulted in a lasting ceasefire, it has been a significant event on a global scale, with consequences that continue to influence the world economy and international politics.

The recent war cannot be explained merely within the framework of the confrontation between the Islamic Republic, the United States, and Israel. It occurred at a time when the international system has entered a period of restructuring, marked by intensifying rivalry among the major powers, the erosion of the previous mechanisms of the global order, and the expansion of geopolitical conflicts. The continuation of the war in Ukraine, developments in the Middle East following 7 October, the growing rivalry between the United States, China, and Russia, and the increasing strategic importance of global energy routes all demonstrate that every major development in the Middle East has become part of the broader struggle over the future balance of power in the world.

The statement issued by the Communist Party of Iran nearly one year ago, on 24 June 2025, concerning the war between Iran and Israel, continues to serve as the foundation of our political line. From the outset, that statement clearly defined the nature of the war, the position of the forces involved, the role of the global powers, and the independent tasks of the revolutionary and working-class movement. Under the current circumstances, with only a fragile ceasefire in place and the future of peace remaining uncertain, it is necessary to further develop that analytical framework and, in light of recent developments, formulate our political and organizational tasks more precisely.

1. The Nature of the War Between the Islamic Republic, the United States, and Israel;

This war is reactionary from both sides.

The Islamic Republic is a reactionary regime "an enemy of the people, misogynistic, anti-worker, and repressive" that is fighting to preserve its rule. Its reactionary policies and actions over the past decades provided the pretext for this attack.

On the other side, Israel is likewise a criminal occupying regime pursuing a policy of genocide against the Palestinian people while seeking to reshape the regional balance of power in its own favor.

The United States, for its part, is fighting to contain the Islamic Republic and transform it into a conventional partner in order to secure its regional hegemony and push back the influence of rival powers.

For this reason, a revolutionary and responsible force never suspends its struggle against the Islamic Republic under the pretext of a foreign attack on Iran, nor does it fall into the illusion of relying on Israel or the United States as "liberating" forces. This orientation constitutes the essence of our independent class and revolutionary policy and must continue to be upheld.

2. The Objectives of This War;

- a) The Islamic Republic of Iran: The primary objective of the Islamic Republic is survival and the prevention of regime collapse or change. Preserving its nuclear program as a bargaining tool, maintaining its missile capabilities as a means of deterrence, and sustaining its influence in regional countries as an instrument of indirect power projection are all vital to consolidating the regime's position as an influential actor in the political balance of the Middle East.
- b) The United States of America: The objectives of the United States include containing and regulating the behavior of the Islamic Republic, preventing Iran from becoming an uncontrollable regional power, and compelling it to accept the rules of a regional order favorable to the United States. These objectives do not necessarily seek regime change. Rather, they are centered on ensuring Israel's security as a strategic ally, limiting Iran's growing ties with powers such as China and Russia, preventing Iran from becoming part of a rival bloc in the emerging global order, and maintaining control over the flow of energy (oil and natural gas) while ensuring that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to international navigation.
- c) Israel: Israel's objectives are more security-driven and maximalist in nature: the overthrow or collapse of the Islamic Republic as its ultimate objective, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons by any means necessary, weakening the Islamic Republic's regional influence, and dismantling its network of proxy forces.
- d) The slow progress of the current negotiations stems from the fact that the Islamic Republic is unwilling to relinquish the principal pillars of its power, as it regards doing so as tantamount to sacrificing its own survival. Israel, in turn, considers these very capabilities an unacceptable threat. Positioned between the two, the United States seeks to manage the crisis without becoming involved in a costly, full-scale war. Consequently, neither war has been capable of resolving these contradictions nor has diplomacy succeeded in overcoming them. For the time being, the conflict continues on multiple levels.

3. Two Different Approaches;

In response to events such as the Dey 2025 massacre and the forty-day war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, two distinct approaches emerged among different currents within the Iranian opposition.

One tendency found both among the monarchist right and sections of the left-relied on political excitement and hasty assessments, recklessly calling on people to take to the streets or portraying foreign military intervention as an "opportunity" to bring down the Islamic Republic. Without regard for the balance of forces, organizational preparedness, leadership, clear political objectives, or the human cost, this approach effectively left defenseless people alone to face either the regime's machinery of repression or the devastation of war.

In contrast, the other tendency warned that calls for mass street mobilization without organization, leadership, and a clear political program, at a time when the Islamic Republic stood ready to use lethal force, could lead to catastrophe. At this stage, it emphasized more effective and less costly forms of struggle, including a general strike, organizing in neighborhoods and workplaces, and the creation of collective leadership.

With regard to the war, this same perspective argued that foreign military intervention would not bring freedom. On the contrary, it could push society away from its independent struggle against the regime (such as the Dey 2025 uprising under the slogan "Bread, Work, Freedom") push the regime's domestic crimes into the background, intensify the security atmosphere, and even contribute to the survival of the government.

Practical experience demonstrated that the first policy was adventurist, irresponsible, and based on illusions in reactionary foreign powers, as well as hopes placed in street or military shocks. The second policy, by contrast, with its emphasis on organization, political consciousness, the balance of forces, and the independence of the people's struggle, proved to be both more realistic and more responsible.

4. The Most Likely Scenario

It is highly likely that negotiations between Iran and the United States, even if they do not result in a strategic and lasting agreement "which appears unlikely under current conditions" will at least lead to an extension of the ceasefire and the emergence of a period of "neither war nor peace." This period may be characterized by prolonged negotiations, reciprocal threats, political and economic pressure, and a permanent state of military preparedness.

The United States is unlikely to have much desire to resume the war in the immediate future, given the costs involved, widespread domestic and regional opposition, and limited strategic benefit. Instead, Washington will most likely continue its familiar policy of maximum pressure in various forms: sanctions, diplomatic isolation, military threats, economic attrition, and incremental extraction of concessions.

This means that, even in the absence of direct military conflict, the Islamic Republic will remain under intense pressure. However, these pressures place the regime before a historic crossroads:

a) Retreat and Internal Realignment of the Ruling Establishment:

A partial retreat under pressure, while it may temporarily reduce the intensity of the crisis, will most likely lead to changes in the composition and leadership of

the Islamic Republic. In other words, it would amount to a top-down reconfiguration of the leadership aimed at preserving the system as a whole at a lower political cost. Current evidence suggests that supporters of this approach presently hold the upper hand.

b) Moving Towards a Survival Model Based on Isolation:

Refusing to retreat could mean choosing a path of intensified repression, a closed economy, a tightly controlled society, and the pursuit of nuclear weapons as the regime's ultimate guarantee of survival, a model resembling that of North Korea. Such a course, however, would merely postpone the crisis rather than resolve it. Should this option be pursued, another war with Israel would shift from being a remote possibility to a serious prospect.

In either case, the conclusion is clear: the regime's crisis will not be resolved; only its form will change.

Iran After the War: Prospects and Our Tasks

Introduction

The practical end of the war and the formal establishment of a ceasefire should not be interpreted as the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East. What is currently unfolding is the reconfiguration of the same underlying crisis in a different form. Understanding this distinction is the basis of any sound analysis and any practical strategy. This report examines the reasons behind the ceasefire and its impact on the regional balance of forces and the situation inside Iran, and outlines the tasks that lie before us.

1. The Necessity of the Ceasefire and the Agreement;

The conditions that made the ceasefire both possible and inevitable stemmed from the same material logic of crisis that had made the war itself necessary. Nevertheless, the United States and the regional powers had no desire to prolong the conflict. The enormous economic costs, insecurity in energy markets and shipping routes from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, and global capital's need for a minimum degree of stability in order to maintain profitability were among the reasons for this reluctance.

Israel, despite its desire to continue the war, was compelled to accept this agreement because of its vital dependence on American support. Furthermore, prolonging the war risked deepening Israel's international isolation, increasing pressure from world public opinion, and intensifying internal divisions both in the United States including the widening rift between public opinion, the administration, and President Trump himself and within Israel.

2. The New Agreement and the Shift in the Balance of Forces;

The central question is not whether the Islamic Republic gained more concessions than the United States, or vice versa. Rather, the crucial issue is

what changes this agreement brings about in the class and political balance of forces throughout the region and in the domestic balance of power within Iran. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was not merely a technical nuclear agreement. It also created a limited economic opening, temporarily strengthened the technocrats and the liberal-rentier bourgeoisie, and relatively weakened the hard-line factions. The JCPOA emerged under conditions in which the United States operated within a relatively stable international order aimed at containing Iran's nuclear program, while the Islamic Republic sought sanctions relief in order to preserve its existing model of rentier-military capitalism. The new agreement, however, has emerged after an actual regional war and within the context of the deepening crisis of global capitalism, the strategic rivalry between the United States and China, and the weakening of the American-centered order in the Middle East. We are therefore confronting a new stage in the crisis of regional hegemony, not a return to the relatively stable conditions that prevailed between 2013 and 2016. This agreement does not represent the end of the crisis; rather, it constitutes a new configuration of the same regional crisis.

3. The Main Factors in the New Regional Alignment;

- Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: These states, through their enormous investments in projects such as NEOM and various free economic zones, depend upon stable oil prices and secure maritime trade routes. The relative rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, together with their growing relations with China within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, demonstrates that these countries seek to operate simultaneously within multiple centers of power rather than relying exclusively on the United States.
- The United States and Israel: The United States seeks to preserve its control over the region and restore the full dominance of the petrodollar system while avoiding another prolonged war of attrition. Israel's right-wing government, however, driven by extreme nationalism, seeks to settle the question of the Islamic Republic through military force as rapidly and decisively as possible.
- The Islamic Republic: The Islamic Republic's network of proxy forces" from Hezbollah and the Houthis to various Iraqi armed groups" has suffered significant setbacks. The financial, logistical, and political costs of maintaining these networks have risen substantially, while poverty, inflation, and popular discontent inside Iran have become far more severe. This situation creates favorable conditions for exposing the anti-national and anti-working-class character of these policies by highlighting the contradiction between the enormous costs of regional intervention and the urgent social needs of the people inside Iran.
- Russia and China: Neither Russia nor China represents an anti-capitalist alternative. Both are forms of state capitalism that benefit from strategic

competition with the United States while reproducing the same underlying logic of profit and market relations. Neither power has any interest in uncontrollable regional instability.

- Europe: Unlike during the period of the JCPOA, Europe now plays largely a secondary role. Internal crises" including energy shortages, migration pressures, and the growth of the far right" have significantly reduced its capacity to influence events.

4. The Impact of the Agreement on the Internal Structure of the Islamic Republic;
The continued survival of the Islamic Republic in its present form has no economic solution, while its political solution itself generates further political crises. The Islamic Republic is a rentier-military-ideological capitalist regime. The agreement does not call this character into question; it merely modifies the regime's method of governance and survival: a degree of flexibility in foreign policy without any genuine opening of the political sphere. Rather than resolving the crisis, the ruling establishment is simply changing the way it manages it.

The multiple crises that will remain even if external pressure is reduced include: the crisis of legitimacy inherited from the uprisings of 2017, 2019, 2022, and 2025; the economic crisis characterized by inflation, unemployment, and the collapse of the national currency; the crisis in the relationship between the state and society; the environmental crisis; and the crisis of the pension funds. These are all symptoms of a rentier peripheral capitalist system incapable of sustained capital accumulation, constantly oscillating between distributing rents to networks of power and violently suppressing social protest.

Following the agreement, the government will likely promise the release of part of its frozen assets, increased oil exports, the activation of major development projects, and a relative easing of tensions in the foreign exchange market. However, within the existing structure, these gains will not reach the people's tables. Instead, they will be used to reduce the state's budget deficit, strengthen the security apparatus, revive semi-state enterprises, and channel new rents to contractors closely connected to those in power.

The real outcome will be a renewed distribution of rents among the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its economic networks, religious foundations, major oil and gas contractors, and sections of the dependent commercial bourgeoisie. At the lower levels of society, however, poverty, unemployment, temporary employment contracts, the housing crisis, the deterioration of the pension system, and class inequality will all remain.

The experience of the Islamic Republic has demonstrated that whenever external pressure has eased, the domestic political climate has not necessarily become more open indeed, sometimes the opposite has occurred. Feeling relatively more secure from the threat of foreign intervention, the regime has often intensified internal repression.

Following the recent agreement, it is likewise likely that control over the streets will be tightened; pressure on labor activists, teachers, women, students, pensioners, and journalists will increase; independent organizations will come under intensified attack (the current intensification of repression indicates that the coercive approach has gained the upper hand, although limited measures aimed at improving living conditions also remain possible); and new purges within the ruling establishment will take place to eliminate internal rivals. Calm on the external front may therefore be accompanied by intensified repression at home, unless organized social pressure succeeds in imposing a different outcome.

5. Internal Tendencies Within the Islamic Republic and the Climate of Expectation in Society;

Two principal tendencies have become more prominent within the Islamic Republic. The extremist ideological tendency regards any agreement with the United States as an act of "treason" and is concerned about its own economic position in the redistribution of new rents.

The pragmatic tendency, by contrast, considers reducing external pressure essential for preserving the regime. It seeks to demonstrate that the hard core of the ruling establishment is capable of negotiating with the United States without making any changes to the regime's fundamentally authoritarian character.

The disagreement between these two tendencies concerns the method of preserving the regime, not its essential nature. Both share common interests in maintaining the existing political structure, preventing the emergence of an independent popular force, and containing the workers', women's, youth, and oppressed nationalities' movements.

One of the short-term consequences of the recent agreement and the continuation of negotiations is the emergence of a climate of expectation among sections of society. People ask whether the value of the dollar will decline, whether employment opportunities will improve, and whether inflation will come under some degree of control.

This expectation may temporarily slow the rhythm of protests. However, it cannot be sustained if people's actual living conditions "their livelihoods and working conditions" show no tangible improvement.

Iranian society has repeatedly experienced the Islamic Republic's attempts to prolong such periods of waiting for as long as possible, as occurred during the eight years following the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

6. The Weakening of Pro-War Currents and the Opportunity for a Democratic Alternative;

One of the political consequences of the recent agreement is the weakening of those forces whose strategy was based upon aerial bombardment, direct foreign military intervention, and regime collapse from outside.

The pro-war and monarchist currents that had placed their hopes in escalating confrontation between the United States and the Islamic Republic are being weakened both in the eyes of public opinion and by political realities.

If accompanied by the strengthening of democratic, class-based, and popular alternatives, this development could move the political landscape beyond the false binary of "domestic dictatorship versus imperialist intervention." It could instead open the way for a third alternative founded upon freedom, equality, security, and social welfare, an alternative based upon political consciousness, organization, struggle, and a leadership that emerges from within this process itself.

For years, the reformists portrayed themselves as the force of rationality and détente with the West. However, if the recent agreement proceeds directly through the hard core of the ruling establishment, without the mediation of the reformists, it sends the message that negotiations with the United States no longer require them.

The likely result will be a further weakening of the reformists' position. This represents both a danger "because their decline could be replaced by disillusionment and political passivity" and an opportunity, insofar as sections of society may free themselves from the illusion of "reform from above" and begin searching for more fundamental solutions.

7. Opportunities Facing the Social Movements and Our Tasks;

The mere cessation of killing and the reduction of insecurity constitute a genuine opportunity. During the war, every workers' or popular protest was suppressed under the pretext of wartime conditions. With the easing of tensions, the apparatus of repression remains intact, but the objective space for advancing economic and political demands becomes broader.

At the beginning of this new period, protest movements are likely to concentrate on demands that reduce the cost of struggle by avoiding direct confrontation with the state and its security apparatus. These include unpaid wages in private factories, temporary employment contracts, mass dismissals, wage increases in line with inflation, and opposition to destructive privatization policies, such as those experienced at Haft Tappeh, HEPCO, Azarab, and similar enterprises.

In Kurdistan, alongside these struggles, the continuation of civil and cultural movements "which have deep roots in the society" constitutes another important arena capable of preventing the spread of social despair and disillusionment arising from the new circumstances.

Under these conditions, a political-trade union division of labor becomes necessary. The Party must focus its political agitation on democratic freedoms, the right to strike, the right to independent organization, and the abolition of repression, while at the same time keeping the socialist horizon clearly visible, particularly through its propaganda and educational work. Labor activists, on the front lines of struggle, should speak in the language of bread, work, employment contracts, workplace safety, and civil resistance.

This division of labor both raises class consciousness and enables the movement to maintain an organic connection between economic demands and political struggle.

At the same time, one danger must constantly be emphasized: a fascistic turn within the regime, the further strengthening of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the increasing securitization of society, and harsher repression in the urban peripheries.

Our guidance to supporters inside the country is to combine concrete demands with the highest degree of organizational caution.

The central task during this period is to prevent passive expectation from replacing active organization. Instead, this period must become a time for political education, strengthening connections among different centers of protest, and preparing for future waves of social struggle.

8. The Uprisings of 2017–2025 and Their Lessons;

One of the most significant characteristics of this period has been the collapse of the boundary between bread and freedom.

Although some protests "such as those of 2017 and 2019" were initially sparked by economic grievances and fuel prices, they quickly developed into direct challenges to the foundations of religious despotism and the entire political structure.

By 2025, the combination of crushing inflation and profound political distrust had reached its highest point, demonstrating that society no longer believes meaningful improvements in living conditions are possible without fundamental political change.

The "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement of 2022 marked a turning point not only politically but culturally. By challenging patriarchy and authoritarian control over women's bodies, the uprising produced tangible achievements, including what may be described as the effective burial of the compulsory hijab law and a profound transformation in society's attitude towards gender equality. Unlike political fluctuations, these cultural changes have become deeply rooted within society.

From 2017 onwards, protests spread beyond the major cities and the middle classes, actively involving smaller towns and the most disadvantaged social layers. The convergence of the demands of teachers, workers, pensioners, and students reflected the emergence of a common struggle centered upon justice and human dignity.

The uprisings of this period "particularly those of November 2019 and Dey 2025" demonstrated that the regime recognizes no limits in the use of violence and mass killing in order to preserve itself.

At the same time, the deceptive role played by right-wing forces, particularly the monarchists, as well as foreign intervention (including that of Donald Trump)

must not be overlooked. At critical moments, rather than strengthening the movement, these forces contributed to its diversion or weakening.

Lessons for the Future

- The greatest weakness of these spontaneous uprisings was the absence of unified leadership, the lack of a nationwide party, and the absence of political organizations enjoying broad social legitimacy. Security repression and repeated internet shutdowns consistently deepened this organizational weakness.
- The most important lesson for workers and the oppressed is that civil liberties, economic justice, and gender equality are inseparable. The struggle for bread cannot succeed without the struggle against dictatorship, and the reverse is equally true.
- Without independent organizations and clear, achievable demands, even the largest uprisings face serious limitations in achieving immediate political change.
- Finally, victory should not be measured solely by the immediate overthrow of a government. Collective solidarity, the strengthening of the spirit of resistance, and the transformation of society's political culture are achievements that lay the foundations for future social transformation.

9. The Overall Situation and the Tasks of the Left and Radical Forces;

The overall picture following the agreement is clear.

At the top, efforts are underway to rebuild the damaged centers of command, reorganize the security institutions, redistribute economic rents, and contain divisions within the ruling bloc.

At the bottom, however, social discontent, poverty, inequality, the hopelessness of young people, women's anger at discrimination and repression, and the bitter experience of violent repression during recent uprisings continue and in many respects deepen.

The principal issue is not whether dissatisfaction exists. It unquestionably does. The decisive question is how these widespread grievances can, through a concrete historical process and appropriate organizational forms, be transformed into a conscious, durable, and effective political and social force. If organization from below remains weak, fragmented, and unplanned, the reconstruction of power from above will maintain the upper hand, even though it will not resolve the regime's underlying crisis.

However, if the workers', women's, students', marginalized communities', and pensioners' movements succeed in linking economic and social demands with democratic demands; if they transform scattered organizational experiences into nationwide and durable networks; and if they unite around a clear vision of social

justice and freedom, then the agreement will no longer be able to confine Iran's future within the framework of bargaining between the major powers and the hard core of the regime. It is precisely here that the task of the left and radical forces becomes clear:

Neither placing our hopes in war and foreign intervention, nor placing our hopes in reform from the summit of power; but rather forging a living connection between the struggle for bread and work and the struggle for freedom and equality, and consciously organizing that struggle on a nationwide scale.

Our Tasks and Priorities

1. Freeing Ourselves from Two Harmful Illusions;

- The illusion of liberation from outside: Neither external pressure, military attack, nor intervention by the major world powers will pave the way for the freedom of the people of Iran. Such pressures merely readjust the balance among reactionary forces, while it is the people who bear the cost.
- The illusion of victory without organization and strong nationwide leadership: Victory can only be achieved through the combination of three essential elements: political consciousness, organization, and leadership. In the absence of these elements, calling on people to pour into the streets merely imposes casualties and raises the cost of change in society. The internal crises of the regime and divisions within the ruling establishment, without the necessary level of preparedness, will not lead to the liberation of the people. The gap between the weakening of a regime and its actual downfall can only be filled by the organized power of the people.

These two principles constitute the backbone of our policy in the coming period.

2. The Need for Clear Tactics in Light of the General Strategy of the Communist Party of Iran;

- a. Taking Apparently Small, Step-by-Step Victories Seriously. Every achievement gives people the strength to take the next step forward. If we examine the experience of forty-seven years of struggle and resistance against the Islamic Republic, one fundamental conclusion emerges: every retreat made by this regime "even those clearly contradicting its own nature and ideology" has been imposed solely through the social and political struggles of the people. This demonstrates that although the people of Iran have not yet achieved their ultimate objective, their struggles have not been in vain. None of these sacrifices have been futile. On the contrary, every wave of struggle has accumulated new experience, greater political consciousness, increased courage, and greater capacity for the battles yet to come.
- b. Transforming Social Pressure into Lasting Organization. The coming period will be one of continued pressure upon the government. However, if this pressure is to lead to genuine improvements in people's living conditions and political opening, one decisive condition must be fulfilled: every local and nationwide

struggle must leave behind a higher level of organization than before.

The experience of recent years has demonstrated that the future path of social and political transformation in Iran does not lie in explosive uprisings alone, however heroic and widespread they may be, when they lack lasting organization and leadership.

Such uprisings can break the wall of fear, but by themselves they cannot permanently alter the balance of forces.

For this reason, our central task is to formulate practical, achievable, and organization-building political tactics based upon the Party's overall strategy.

The central axis of these tactics must be the creation and strengthening of independent organizations. These organized networks must be built through the daily struggles for bread, work, freedom, equality, and other immediate demands.

The end of the war can and must mark the beginning of a new stage of broad, conscious struggle for the right to strike and the right to organize.

Until these rights are imposed upon the existing power structure both legally and in practice, struggles over livelihood will inevitably remain fragmented, localized, and limited in their effectiveness.

Once these rights are won and consolidated, however, struggles for bread, housing, healthcare, and education can proceed on a broader and more effective nationwide basis, paving the way for further advances.

Today, more than ever, workers and working people must overcome isolation and fragmentation. They must build circles of solidarity in workplaces and neighborhoods, from cooperatives and mutual aid funds to broader organizational forms.

To build genuine independent organizations, they must take small but persistent steps.

The repeated crises of recent decades have demonstrated that only through unity, organization, and collective struggle can people withstand these storms and open the path toward a more dignified life.

3. The Position of the Workers' Movement;

Among all fields of struggle, the workers' movement occupies a decisive position.

If, during the post-war period, the workers' movement succeeds in imposing two fundamental demands upon the government, many of the obstacles confronting other social movements will likewise be overcome:

the right to independent organization and the right to strike, both understood in their broadest sense.

- The Right to Strike: The right to strike is not simply the right to stop working. Once recognized, it encompasses an entire package of rights and guarantees, including the right to assemble and demonstrate, protection against dismissal or punishment because of participation in a strike; the right to collective bargaining and collective agreements. The right to publicize the strike in order to gain public

support. The right to solidarity actions and sympathy strikes. The right to physical security for workers during strikes. The right to establish picket lines and demonstrations outside workplaces. The right of access to workplaces; and the right to social and financial support, including strike funds.

In other words, a strike is not merely a work stoppage; it is the transformation of the workers' dispersed strength into an instrument of collective social power.

- **The Right to Independent Organization:** Workers must have the unrestricted right to establish trade unions, labor unions, associations, or any other independent workers' organizations; to join them freely; to elect their genuine representatives; and collectively to defend their economic, professional, and human rights. This right necessarily requires the prohibition of dismissals, intimidation, harassment, fabricated legal cases, and every other form of interference with legitimate trade union activity.

Independent organization means that the worker ceases to exist as an isolated and defenseless individual and becomes part of a collective social force.

Without these two rights, the working class will remain fragmented, vulnerable, and easily repressed.

By winning these rights, however, it becomes possible to connect economic struggles with political struggles, economic demands with democratic freedoms, and the workers' movement with the broader social movements.

Our Tasks in Kurdistan

Introduction

Under the current post-war conditions, given the political, social, and class characteristics of Kurdistan, and taking into account the capacities, history of struggle, and accumulated experience of its society, it is essential that Party activists direct their efforts more than ever towards social, mass-based, and deeply rooted activities in the everyday lives of the people. If political struggle becomes detached from society itself "from the real needs of the people and from the concrete demands of workers, women, young people, teachers, Kolbars (cross-border porters), and the urban and rural working population" it will be reduced to the level of abstract slogans.

For this reason, the tactical orientation during this period must be based upon the principle that political and Party activity should maintain an active presence within ongoing social struggles and, through organization, political education, and the linking together of diverse demands, pave the way for the achievement of our long-term strategic objectives.

With regard to developments in Kurdistan, it is also necessary to mention the establishment of the "Kurdistan Parties Alliance Centre." This is an important issue that must be recalled in this introduction.

Although Komala participated actively in the "Dialogue Centre" process, it did not sign the Alliance Charter, and publicly explained its reasons in a detailed statement.

Komala's Position

- Dialogue, yes but with transparency.
Komala supports civilized dialogue among the political parties of Kurdistan. However, it insists upon recognizing genuine political differences, maintaining healthy political competition, and accepting the democratic judgment of the people, rather than concealing disagreements.
 - Komala's strategic principles.
These include unity with the workers' movement throughout Iran; opposition to alignment with the policies of the United States and Israel; opposition to the right-wing and monarchist opposition; and rejection of any alliance with the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK). The Alliance Charter lacks sufficient clarity on all of these fundamental issues.
 - Politics must come before institution-building.
Before agreement on a common political program can be achieved, there must first be a clear policy and tactical orientation appropriate to the present situation. Establishing institutions such as a Joint Diplomatic Committee without a clearly defined political line would be ineffective and could even create new crises.
 - The question of armed forces.
Komala believes that weapons should not remain under the control of political parties but should instead be placed under the authority of democratically elected popular institutions. It considers the proposal for a unified "Kurdistan Army" under party command to be dangerous, since political disagreements could eventually divide such a force into hostile factions.
 - Popular sovereignty, not the division of power among political parties.
Any political vacuum should be filled by democratic popular institutions "neighborhood councils, workplace councils, and university councils" not through power-sharing agreements among political parties.
 - Warning concerning the role of the United States and Israel.
In light of the reports circulating at the time the charter was being signed, Komala expressed serious concern and warned that a policy of alignment with the United States and Israel would prove disastrous for the Kurdish movement.
 - Continued support for dialogue.
Komala continues to regard the Dialogue Centre as a positive achievement and supports the continuation of dialogue among the Kurdish political forces.
 - Refusing to sign the charter does not mean withdrawing from cooperation.
Komala remains committed to cooperation based upon honesty, transparency, and mutual respect for political differences.
 - Our fundamental position remains this:
A unity built upon concealing differences will collapse at decisive moments; clarity today is better than crisis tomorrow.
- 1) Tactical Orientation and Its Connection to Strategic Objectives;
Today's tactics must never be regarded as separate from our long-term strategic objectives.
On the contrary, every step towards organizing workers, every effort to build women's

organizations, every struggle for democratic freedoms, every cultural, artistic, or environmental initiative, and every demand for education in the mother tongue (if pursued consciously within a clear social vision) can become one link in the broader chain of struggle for the fundamental transformation of society.

In other words, correct tactical policy serves as a bridge between the people's immediate needs and our future strategic objectives.

On the one hand, it brings about tangible improvements in people's living conditions; on the other, it familiarizes the masses with the necessity of organization, unity, and direct participation in determining their own future.

- a. **Active Participation in Workers' Trade Associations:** One of the most important aspects of this orientation is a stronger presence within the existing workers' trade associations in the cities of Kurdistan.
The working class and working people live under conditions in which inflation, unemployment, poverty wages, the absence of insurance, and job insecurity have placed their lives under severe pressure.
Party activists must be actively involved in workers' ongoing struggles: pursuing demands related to livelihoods; supporting teachers, retired workers, workshop workers, agricultural workers, construction workers, service workers (including platform workers), seasonal workers, and Kolbars; and playing a practical role in establishing mutual solidarity funds.
Such activity enables workers to gain experience in organization, collective decision-making, and reliance on their own strength.
This is precisely the point at which the daily struggle for bread and work becomes connected to the broader horizon of popular rule and social justice.
- b. **Organizing Women Around Their Fundamental Rights:** Another major field of activity is organizing women around their fundamental rights on the basis of the Women's Rights Declaration.
The oppression of women in Kurdistan, as throughout Iran, is intertwined with class, patriarchal, religious, and political structures.
In Kurdistan, women simultaneously face multiple forms of oppression: gender discrimination, traditional and religious pressures, economic inequality, domestic violence, so-called honor killings, restrictions on employment and social participation, and the denial of equal rights within both the family and society.
For this reason, establishing women's organizations and local women's groups can play a decisive role in changing the social balance of power.
The struggle for freedom of choice in dress, the right to work, equal pay, the right to divorce, child custody rights, combating domestic violence, and defending women's individual and social independence are all integral parts of building a future society based on equality and freedom.
Every step that brings women out of isolation and transforms them into an organized and active social force is, in reality, a step towards deeper social

transformation.

- c. **Defending Democratic and Civil Liberties:** Defending democratic and civil liberties is another central pillar of this policy. Freedom of expression, freedom of organization, freedom of protest, freedom of the press, the right of assembly, the right to establish political parties and associations, and the people's right to participate directly in governing their own affairs are universal and essential demands. In Kurdistan, these demands are inseparable from the national, social, and class questions. The people of Kurdistan seek not only an end to national discrimination and the security-state atmosphere, but also direct participation in determining their own future and administering their own society. Accordingly, work in defense of democratic freedoms should be based upon the Declaration of the Rights of the Working People of Kurdistan and Komala's Program for Popular Rule. Defending political prisoners and social activists; protesting the repression of teachers, students, pensioners, Kolbars, workers, women, and youth; demanding the removal of the military and security presence from towns and villages; and promoting the idea of councils and popular institutions can all transform political freedom from an abstract slogan into a living, everyday necessity.
- d. **Cultural, Artistic, Environmental Activities and the Defense of Mother-Tongue Education:** Cultural, artistic, environmental activities, and the defense of education in the mother tongue must also occupy a prominent place in the social work of Party activists. Culture and art are among the most effective means of communicating with broad sections of society. Poetry, music, theatre, literature, cinema, street art, and local cultural activities can communicate the message of freedom, equality, and resistance in ways that are immediate and widely understood. Likewise, defending the Kurdish language and the right to education in one's mother tongue is part of defending the equal rights of the people of Kurdistan. This demand must be linked to the struggle for free, equal, democratic, and emancipatory education. At the same time, the environmental crisis "including the destruction of forests, water shortages, pollution, degradation of grazing lands, and neglect of natural resources" directly threatens the lives of workers, rural communities, and future generations. Environmental activism can unite young people, teachers, students, villagers, and urban activists around a common cause while strengthening a collective sense of responsibility for society's future.

- e. Linking Different Demands: The decisive point throughout all these fields is to connect national, class, gender, and democratic demands within living social movements.

None of these demands should be viewed in isolation.

A Kolbar is not merely a victim of poverty; they are simultaneously a victim of national oppression, economic injustice, security repression, and the denial of equal opportunities.

A Kurdish woman worker faces not only gender discrimination but also class exploitation and national oppression.

A teacher struggling for education in the mother tongue is not simply advancing a cultural demand, but also fighting for educational justice, democracy, and the right to self-determination.

The task of Party activists is therefore to demonstrate these connections in practice "in slogans, organizations, and everyday activities" so that workers, women, youth, students, teachers, Kolbars, and villagers all come to see themselves as part of one common struggle.

- f. Practicing a Free and Equal Society Today: The importance of these orientations lies in the fact that they transform long-term objectives from abstract slogans into lived social experience.

If our ultimate goal is a free, equal, council-based, socialist society founded upon popular sovereignty, then that society must begin to be practiced today in smaller forms.

When workers establish associations, committees, or solidarity funds to defend their rights, they are, in practice, learning collective self-government.

When women establish independent organizations, they lay the foundations of an equal society.

When people struggle for education in their mother tongue, freedom of association, environmental protection, and democratic rights, they are exercising their right to participate directly in determining their own future.

These are the living building blocks of the path toward social transformation.

- g. Two Simultaneous Outcomes: Pursuing such a policy produces two results simultaneously.

First, it improves people's living conditions, to the greatest extent possible, in a practical and immediate way. The struggle for higher wages, social insurance, job security, women's rights, civil liberties, education in the mother tongue, and environmental protection responds directly to the real and urgent needs of society.

Second, it makes the horizon of revolution and social transformation clearer and more tangible. Through these very struggles, people learn that without organization, solidarity, and their own direct participation, they cannot change their destiny.

In this sense, broad-based social struggle is neither a retreat from our strategic objectives nor a substitute for them. It is the real path toward achieving them.

h. Revolution as the Product of Accumulated Experience

Ultimately, social revolution is not brought about by decree, slogans, or passive expectation.

Revolution is the product of accumulated experience, organization, political consciousness, mutual trust, solidarity, and the active participation of the masses in their everyday struggles.

The correct policy during this period is for Party activists to be present within society, alongside the people, and in the midst of their living struggles; to connect scattered struggles together; to demonstrate the emancipatory and egalitarian horizon through practical activity; and, step by step, to create both the subjective and objective conditions necessary for social transformation. This is the path that both makes life more humane today and brings the prospect of a future founded upon freedom, equality, and the people's own will closer to reality.

2) Security and Continuing Our Work in the Post-War Period;

The first months following the end of the war are a sensitive and decisive period. At this stage, the Islamic Republic is acting with urgency and seeks to move before any new wave of protest can emerge. This danger particularly confronts political activists at every level. This issue is not confined to Kurdistan. All activists inside the country must exercise the utmost vigilance.

Political and organizational preparedness must be maintained. During this period, calmness and caution are essential. Until the Party announces a clearer line through its official channels, every action that could provide the forces of repression with a pretext should be avoided.

Today's vigilance is the condition for tomorrow's continued struggle.

3) Komala's Open Organization in the Kurdistan Region;

- a. The Place of Armed Struggle: Although, for more than two decades, Komala's Peshmerga forces have refrained from carrying out offensive military operations against the forces of the Islamic Republic, based on an objective assessment of changing conditions, this has never meant questioning the legitimacy, authenticity, or historical necessity of armed resistance within the framework of the right of legitimate self-defence as part of our strategy.

The objective historical reality is that armed struggle was never the first choice of the people of Kurdistan. It was imposed upon them by the regime's military assault on Kurdish society.

The people wanted freedom, and because they were determined to defend the democratic achievements they had won, they were compelled to take up arms. They did not resort to violence; rather, they resisted one of the most brutal systems of repression in modern history and defended their human dignity.

Today, the politically conscious society of Kurdistan, drawing upon its rich historical experience, is developing newer and more advanced forms of mass struggle.

Nationwide, unified political general strikes have become an effective, established, and powerful weapon against the regime, a form of struggle that achieves the greatest political and organizational gains while imposing the lowest possible human cost.

The development of lasting civil movements, local networks, and new grassroots leaders in universities, factories, and neighborhoods has placed society on the path toward full preparedness.

The magnificent expression of this preparedness became unmistakably evident during the revolutionary "Woman, Life, Freedom" uprising.

This movement, whose philosophy and central slogan are rooted in the progressive political culture of Komala's Peshmerga movement, has opened a clear and irreversible path leading society towards ultimate victory.

- b. Komala's Current Position in the Kurdistan Region: All available evidence indicates that, during the post-war period, the conditions under which we operate in the Kurdistan Region will change.

The precise form and extent of these changes cannot yet be determined. What is certain is that the Islamic Republic will intensify its pressure on the Kurdistan Regional Government in order to place further restrictions on the activities of the Iranian opposition.

We have already experienced a degree of such pressure following the signing of the Iran-Iraq Security Agreement, and we have developed practical experience in adapting our work to the new conditions.

This policy has already been formulated in detail and has, in some respects, begun to be implemented.

Two fundamental principles will guide all of our actions:

First, the essential functions and continuity of Komala's activities must not be disrupted.

Second, the security and livelihoods of comrades working within this section of the organization must not be placed at risk.