{"id":3209,"date":"2026-09-19T08:45:05","date_gmt":"2026-09-19T08:45:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/?p=3209"},"modified":"2026-09-19T08:47:32","modified_gmt":"2026-09-19T08:47:32","slug":"the-war-between-the-united-states-and-the-islamic-republic-an-ambiguous-strategy-on-both-sides","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/the-war-between-the-united-states-and-the-islamic-republic-an-ambiguous-strategy-on-both-sides\/","title":{"rendered":"The War Between the United States and the Islamic Republic; An Ambiguous Strategy on Both Sides"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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One of the prominent features of the tensions between the Islamic Republic and the United States (and, in connection with this, Israel) is that neither side has a clear and predictable strategy. Contrary to the common perception that conflicts are the result of precise and pre-planned schemes, evidence from the past several years shows that both sides have become trapped in a situation in which neither full-scale war nor lasting peace is possible; and this very uncertainty has itself become a source of danger. Understanding this ambiguity is of vital importance for a society that is paying the costs of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Over the past two decades, the Islamic Republic had built its strategy on three pillars: expanding regional influence through allied forces, developing its missile and nuclear programs as levers of deterrence and bargaining, and managing tensions at a lower level in order to prevent direct war. All three pillars are now facing serious failures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The blows inflicted on the network of allied forces in the region, the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the change in the balance of power in Syria, the vulnerabilities exposed in its defense systems and intelligence capabilities, and the emergence of weaknesses in the face of targeted operations, which resulted in the deaths of two levels of the Islamic Republic\u2019s leadership apparatus, have weakened the assumption of deterrence. A policy based on \u201cwar farther from the borders\u201d in practice brought the war closer to the country\u2019s vital centers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the more fundamental problem is internal in nature. The Islamic Republic cannot enter into a prolonged war because it does not have the economic and social backing necessary for such a war. An economy struggling with chronic inflation, budget deficits, the collapse in the value of the national currency, energy and water crises, and deteriorating infrastructure does not have the capacity to withstand a war of attrition. More importantly, a society that in recent years has repeatedly demonstrated its aversion to the government through nationwide protests “from the December 2017 uprising and the November 2019 protests to the \u201cWoman, Life, Freedom\u201d uprising and the killings in December of last year” has not left the government with a reliable home front. The government knows that prolonging the war could activate existing divisions instead of creating national unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, genuine compromise is also costly for the Islamic Republic. An overt retreat on the nuclear issue, the missile program, and regional policy would mean abandoning components to which part of the ideological identity and logic of the regime\u2019s survival are tied. The history of the past 47 years shows that creating crises has consistently been a tool for the regime\u2019s survival. Justifying domestic repression, securitizing the environment, and suppressing social demands have all been linked to the atmosphere of tension with the West. Fully resolving tensions with the West would confront the government with unanswered domestic questions: if there are no sanctions, who is responsible for poverty and inefficiency?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The result of this situation is the adoption of a policy centered on tactics rather than strategy: neither war nor agreement; buying time and engaging in tense and fruitless negotiations. Such a policy is neither strategic nor sustainable; it is more an example of the saying \u201cthere may be relief from one pillar to the next\u201d and of pragmatic management of day-to-day crises for survival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other side, the United States faces a different kind of ambiguity. The military and economic power of the United States is not comparable to that of Iran, but instrumental superiority does not mean that there is a clear strategy. The main question that the U.S. government has failed to provide a clear answer to for three decades is: What is the ultimate goal? Limiting the nuclear program? Changing behavior? Or regime change?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Each of these objectives requires different tools and costs, and there are contradictions among them. The policy of \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d weakened Iran\u2019s economy, but did not halt its nuclear program or eliminate its regional influence. Limited military strikes can damage facilities, but they cannot destroy technical knowledge and motivation; they may even push the government toward deciding to acquire a deterrent weapon. A large-scale war is also a nightmare for the United States, with the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan carrying enormous costs, regional instability, and a global energy crisis whose consequences are also uncertain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, domestic constraints play a decisive role. American public opinion is tired of prolonged Middle Eastern wars. The strategic priority of the United States, with or without Trump, is focused on competition with China and managing the crisis in its relations with Europe and Russia. As a result, the United States employs a combination of sanctions, limited operations, diplomacy, and verbal threats. A combination that is neither capable of bringing the Islamic Republic to its knees nor of leading the United States itself toward a clear objective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another factor that deepens the ambiguity is the difference between Israel\u2019s calculations and those of the United States. Israel regards the Iranian nuclear threat as an existential issue and is prepared to accept risks that the United States is not. This lack of coordination between the objectives of the United States and Israel increases the possibility of escalation: a limited operation by one side could create a chain of reactions that none of the parties had planned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This ambiguous situation has three specific consequences for the people of Iran. First, the continuation of widespread poverty and economic instability. Investment, production, and long-term planning are impossible under the shadow of the possibility of war. The exchange rate, inflation, and prices of essential goods react to every piece of news and threat, and the burden falls more heavily on workers, retirees, and low-income groups. Second, the intensification of the securitization of the domestic environment. The government uses wartime or quasi-wartime conditions to expand repression, arrest activists, restrict the internet, and close the space for protest. Third, the danger of the regime\u2019s collapse while there is no alternative to replace it; in such a case, Iran could become a battleground for warlords. Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan are living examples of such a danger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the ambiguity in the strategies of the two sides cannot lead to the conclusion that the danger of war has been eliminated; on the contrary, the absence of a clear strategy increases the possibility of miscalculation. But the more important conclusion is that neither of these two poles carries a solution for the freedom and welfare of the people of Iran. The Islamic Republic has neither the ability to provide security and livelihoods nor the will to open up the political space; and foreign powers, by virtue of their own interests, are neither concerned with democracy in Iran nor do they bear the human costs of their decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under such conditions, the only force that can defend society against both dangers (domestic authoritarianism and military adventurism) is the people themselves and their independent organizations: the labor movement, teachers, women, students, and civil society institutions. Simultaneous opposition to war and authoritarianism, linking economic demands with the demand for freedom, and strengthening organization from below; these are the components of that third path that outlines the only clear path remaining.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

One of the prominent features of the tensions between the Islamic Republic and the United…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3210,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[33,24,10,18,30,8,13,15],"post_badge":[],"class_list":["post-3209","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-daily-quote","tag-abroad-committee-of-the-communist-party-of-iran","tag-communist-party-of-iran","tag-cpi","tag-daily-quote","tag-iran","tag-komala","tag-usa","tag-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3209","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3209"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3209\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3214,"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3209\/revisions\/3214"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3210"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3209"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3209"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3209"},{"taxonomy":"post_badge","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpiran.net\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/post_badge?post=3209"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}