Statement by Komala Explaining the Reasons for Not Signing the Alliance Document Among Several Kurdish Parties

As you are aware, five of the seven parties participating in the “Dialogue Center of Iranian Kurdistan Parties” signed a joint “Alliance” document. Komala, as one of the participating parties in the Dialogue Center, has from the very beginning of this process sought to play an active role in advancing constructive dialogue. However, it did not sign this alliance document. Since transparency toward the people of Kurdistan is one of our fundamental principles, we consider it our duty to clearly and fully explain the reasons for this decision.

1. The seven parties gathered within the Dialogue Center do not share identical political programs, strategies, traditions of struggle, or historical backgrounds. Within this framework, our movement, as a socialist current, belongs to a well-known political tradition in Kurdistan’s political society. In this tradition, the workers’ and toilers’ movements throughout the country are regarded as allies of the Kurdish people’s movement. In this tradition, alignment with the policies of the United States and Israel regarding Iran and Kurdistan has no place. Opposition to the right-wing opposition, specifically monarchists who openly threaten leftist forces and the rights of nations from now on, is one of the pillars of our politics. At the same time, however, we see this political diversity not as a weakness, but as part of the living reality of Kurdistan’s society. In our view, any sustainable cooperation among these parties can only bear fruit if these differences are transparently reflected in official documents, in the process of cooperation, in decision-making mechanisms, and in the parties’ shared commitments. Experience has shown that any cooperation built upon ignoring real differences will face crisis and disintegration during sensitive political moments.
2. In our opinion, regarding cooperation and coordination among Kurdish political parties, before seeking common programmatic points “which is a matter for the future” agreement must first be reached on concrete strategies, policies, and tactics related to the current situation, as well as on practical mechanisms that are immediately relevant. For example, forming bodies such as a “Joint Diplomacy Committee” is not in itself the central issue; the main issue is determining the policy that will guide the activity of such a body. An alliance lacking political clarity on this matter would in practice be ineffective, and differing interpretations regarding its mechanisms could themselves become a source of crisis and deadlock. This issue is especially sensitive in relation to states or opposition political organizations confronting the Islamic Republic.
3. One of our principal points of disagreement concerns the role of armed forces in the context of future political transformations in Iran. Komala’s clear position is that after any political change in Kurdistan, weapons should not remain in the hands of party forces, but should, within a limited period and through coordination among armed Kurdish parties, be transferred to democratically elected popular institutions. This principle is vital to preventing military rivalries and guaranteeing a democratic transition. Even unifying the armed forces of parties into a single structure “if possible at all, which itself appears difficult” cannot guarantee that weapons will not later be used in political disputes.
4. In our view, political parties must never divide political power among themselves over the heads of the people under any circumstances. Sovereignty belongs to elected popular institutions, and under no pretext such as a “transitional period” or “people not being ready” can the people’s natural right to directly exercise their sovereignty be restricted. Any vacuum of power that emerges should be answered by encouraging people to establish councils and democratic institutions in neighborhoods, cities, workplaces, universities, and elsewhere, not by parties filling that vacuum among themselves. Political parties must instead create the conditions necessary for popular sovereignty, strengthen institutions emerging from the people’s vote, and fully respect their will and choices.
5. Iranian Kurdistan possesses strong social and civil movements. In our view, the dominance of a military approach over politics would weaken this invaluable asset for the future of this society. Therefore, if armed party forces are to be integrated into a unified “Kurdish Corps,” then before proposing such a force, there must first be a clear agreement on the essential question: what policy governs this force, and under the authority of what institution does it operate? In our opinion, such a force must necessarily be under the guidance of popular institutions, not under the command of political parties; otherwise, in the event of political disagreements among parties, this seemingly unified force could suddenly fragment into groups loyal to their respective parties and ultimately serve the projects of one party or another.
6. The enemies of the Kurdish people seek, through various means, to sow division either by holding separate negotiations with parties or, if that fails, by inflaming national and sectarian differences among Kurds and Turks, Shiites and Sunnis, and others within Kurdistan’s society. Neutralizing this policy requires a clear agreement based on the solidarity of the struggles of all people sharing the same fate across Iran, regardless of nationality, gender, or religion. The unity of struggle between the people of Kurdistan and other progressive movements throughout Iran is a vital condition for the victory of Kurdistan’s revolutionary movement. In our view, any cooperation document must clearly distinguish itself from racist and right-wing nationwide currents, and seek the allies of Kurdistan’s revolutionary movement among other progressive and emancipatory movements throughout Iran, including the labor movement, the women’s movement, the student movement, and the progressive and liberation movements of other oppressed nations.
7. Most of the essential political points we have raised are either entirely absent from the proposed platform or presented in such vague and interpretable ways that they cannot form the basis of a sustainable alliance. Since our disagreement was not limited merely to the structure or formulation of the document, but rather concerns the necessity of political clarity, transparent decision-making mechanisms, and specific commitments within the framework of cooperation, we do not believe the solution lies in amending this or that clause. We believe that any platform must from the outset be built upon political clarity and precise agreements; otherwise, it will suffer the same fate as previous unsuccessful experiences.
8. We regard the creation of the “Dialogue Center” as a positive and necessary step appropriate to the current sensitive situation. In recent months, this center has played an important role in establishing regular communication channels and creating a degree of political closeness. The experience of this period, as well as recent years, has shown that the active parties in Kurdistan have been able to organize effective cooperation and important political initiatives even without agreement on a written common platform. This political asset should not be ignored.
9. Our non-participation in this particular “alliance” does not mean withdrawing from cooperation altogether. We continue to place cooperation and joint efforts concerning the general interests of the people of Kurdistan with the active political parties of Iranian Kurdistan on our agenda, and we support the continuation of ongoing and constructive dialogue for this purpose. However, an alliance built on weak foundations and avoidance of expressing real differences will not only fail to advance Kurdistan’s movement, but will become a heavy burden upon it at critical moments. We believe in an alliance built honestly and with respect for differences.
10. Komala possesses a comprehensive approved document concerning cooperation and coordination among the active political parties in Kurdistan, which will soon once again be made available to public opinion in this context.

Central Committee of Komala
Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran

February 22, 2026